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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AMANDA TH1MMES, :
PlaintiffAppellant, : Case No. 991099-CA
v.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, et al., : Priority No. 15
Defendants/Appellees. :
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). On February 11, 2000,
this matter was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §£ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. The trial court correctly dismissed this action with prejudice due to the failure
of the plaintiff to file the requisite notice of claim with the Attorney General.
This issue was raised by the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 21-31.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the
defendants' motions to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court
should give the trial courts' ruling no deference and review it under a correctness
standard. Zion's First National Bank v. Fox & Co., 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE STATU FES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time for
filing notice. (1987)
Aclaim against the state, oragainst its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim arises, orbefore the
expiration ofany extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amanda Thimmcs filed this action against Utah State University and its employee,
Haven B. Hendricks, on January 11, 1999. R. 1-6. The defendants responded by filing a
motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction. R. 21-31,
On September 14, 1999, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision granting
the defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 148-50. Plaintiff objected to the form of the
proposed order of dismissal and sought reconsideration of the trial court's decision (R.
176-94). The trial court signed the order of dismissal on October 12, 1999. R. 194a-96.
By a Memorandum Decision dated November 12, 1999., the trial court denied the
plaintiffs objections and hersought for reconsideration and signed a final order of
dismissal on December 6, 1999. R. 231-32, 236-37. Thimmcs filed the present appeal on
December 15, 1999. R. 241-43.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Amanda Thimmcs alleged in her complaint that she was struck by a state vehicle
on March 17, 1997 that was operated by Haven B. Hendricks, a state employee. R. 2.
The actual facts concerning Ms. Thimmes' claim against the defendants were not disputed
by the defendants' motion to dismiss. The only facts in question concern the adequacy of
the notices of claim filed by Ms. Thimmes.
It is undisputed that Ms. Thimmes never filed a notice of claim with the Attorney
General of Utah. Instead, her notice of claim was sent to Utah State University and the
Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services, two separate
"agencies concerned" under the then existing statute. R. 29-31, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-12
(1987). It is also undisputed that the attorney who had misfiled Ms. Thimmes notice of
claim had previously filed notices of claim correctly with the Utah Attorney General. R.
142.
Ms. Thimmcs' attorney had worked directly with Risk Management (particularly
Claims Adjuster Jim Sefandonakis) concerning the payment of PIP benefits. R. 52-67. In
claiming that service of her notice of claim on a division of a different department of state
government should count as service on the Attorney General, plaintiff relies not upon her
attorney's reading of the law, but upon alleged telephone communications between a
paralegal working for her attorney and an unnamed layperson who was not employed by
the Office of the Attorney General.1
While Barbara Reissen, the paralegal for plaintiffs then lawyer, originally called
the Attorney General's Office, she does not claim that any employee ofthat office gave
her any advice as to where a notice ofclaim should be filed. R. 129 *j 4-5. Instead, she
was referred to different departments of state government, and finally spoke with an
unnamed employee ofthe Division of Risk Management in the Department of
Administrative Services.
5. After being referred to three different departments by the Attorney
General's Office, 1finally spoke with a representative from the Department
of Administrative Services, Risk Management Division. The representative
instructed me to send the "Notice of Claim" directly to that office. I was
also instructed to address the "Notice of Claim" to Mr. Jim Stefandonakis
[sic. |, as he was the claims adjuster presently handling the claim.
6. Because of the specific statutory requirements governing the mailing of
the "Notice of Claim," I asked the representative if this was a division of the
Attorney General's office. I was told yes.
R. 1291|5-6.
SUMMARY OK ARGUMENT
A notice of claim is required of all plaintiffs who seek to file an action against the
State of Utah or its employees. Thimmes filed notices of claim with Utah State
1 While different from the unsworn statements of hearsay in the plaintiffs original
response to the defendants' motion (R. 42-44), for purposes ofappeal, the defendants rely
upon the sworn affidavit of Barbara Reissen as to what telephone conversations she had,
and with whom. R. 129-30.
University and with the Risk Management Division. Both entities are clearly "agencies
concerned" under Utah law and not the Attorney General. At no time did she file the
necessary second notice of claim with the Attorney General. Plaintiffs claim that service
on Risk Management should be counted as service on the Attorney General is contrary to
law and would require an extension of this Court's decision in Bischel v. Merritt, 907
P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) that this Court has already refused to do.
The trial court correctly dismissed this action for lack of jurisdiction and this Court
should affirm that decision,
ARGUMENT
I. THIMMES FAILED TO FILE THE NECESSARY
NOTICE OF CLAIM WITH THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have held that the filing of the notices of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Lamarrv. Utah State
Dep't ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Rushton v. Salt Lake
County. 1999 UT 36,1|18, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 249-50
(Utah 19SS). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamair; Rushton,
1999 UT 36. «T9; Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975),
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that:
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope ot
employment, or under color ofauthority, is barred unless notice ofclaim is
filed with the attorney general and the agency concerned within one year
after the claim arises,....
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1987) (in part).
Prior to May 4, 1998, the statute had required two notices ofclaim, one filed with
the "agency concerned" and the other with the Attorney General. Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-12 (1987). But as of May 4, 1998, the statute was amended to require that notice of
claim be filed only with ihc Attorney General. Governmental Immunity - Notice of
Claim, ch. 164, 1998 Utah Laws 498. This change in the Immunity Act, occuiring only
after the time for filing of notices of claim lapsed in this matter, does not apply to the
present action.
At the time the plaintiff filed her notices of claim with Utah State University and
the Risk Management Division of the Department of Administrative Services, the
effective law of Utah retiuired that one notice of claim be filed with the agency concerned
and that another be filed with the Attorney General. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs
notice of claim was not filed with the Attorney General. The trial court correctly
dismissed this action due to the plaintiffs failure to file the requisite notice of claim with
the Attorney General.
\. liliii" of a Notice of Claim with Risk Management does not Fulfill the
Requirement that such be Filed with the Attorney General.
The relevant Utah law required two notices of claim be filed against the State of
Utah. One notice of claim was to be filed with the Attorney General. The second was to
be filed with the "agency concerned." It is undisputed that the Division of Risk
Management is not a part ofthe Office ofthe Attorney General. Service ofa notice of
claim, that is required by law to be served on the Attorney General, must be done on the
Attorney General, not upon some other entity - even within her own office.
Prior to the mistaken filing of the notice of claim in question, this Court had
already held that Risk Management was an "agency concerned" under the then existing
statute, not an alter ego of the Attorney General. In Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 670-
72 (Utah App. 1994) this Court found that service on Risk Management met the
requirement that one ofthe two notices ofclaim be served on the concerned agency. To
now permit Risk Management to be also an alter ego for the Attorney General would be
to change the requirements ofthe statute. Instead oftwo notices ofclaim, only one would
suffice if it were filed on Risk Management.
This Court, more recently, lias expressly rejected this argument. In Straley v.
Malliday. 2000 UT App 38, ^ 16 n. 9, 997 P.2d 338 (citations omitted), this Court stated:
Although filing with the Division of Risk Management may have been
sufficient to comply with section 63-30-12's former requirement that the
notice of claim also be filed with the agency concerned, it cannot suffice for
the Immunity Act's requirement that notice be filed with the Attorney
General.
B. Plaintiff failed to show estoppel against the Defendants.
Plaintiffs claim, in essence, is that the defendants should be estopped from arguing
her failure to file an appropriate notice ofclaim with the Attorney General. "As a general
rule, estoppel may not be invoked against agovernmental entity." Anderson y_._Pub. Scrv.
Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992). There is only a very limited exception
to this general principle, and those cases most often have involved "very specific written
representations by authorized government entities." Id Indeed, when a party seeks to use
estoppel against the government, an extra element is added that must be proved. Estoppel
will only apply to the state ifotherwise injustice would result and there would be no
substantia] adverse effect on public policy. Consol. Coal v. Div. of StajeLands, 886 P.2d
514, 522 (Utah 1994).
Moreover, as a prerequisite to a finding of injustice, the party asserting
estoppel must show that it acted with "reasonable prudence and diligence"
in relying on the State's representations.
Id, (quoting Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).
By considering the facts upon which the plaintiff claims that estoppel should rest,
it becomes clear that the plaintiff has failed to meet this standard..
First, the plaintiffrelies upon the fact that a claim adjuster from Risk Management
handled her claims for PIP benefits without benefit of a notice of claim and without
indicating that such was necessary. These facts are unremarkable in that they are
mandated by this Court's decision in Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993).
We therefore hold that a suit to recover PIP benefits brought directly against
the State as a self-insurer of its motor vehicles is contractual in nature. The
State's election to self-insure cannot become a stumbling block to the swift
recovery ofPIP benefits. Neel's benefit claim should therefore be resolved
in the same speedy manner it would have been had the State purchased an
independent insurance policy.
854 P.2d at 584 (footnote omitted).
In Neel. this Court expressly rejected the State ofUtah's contention that notices of
claim should be filed before seeking recovery of PIP benefits. The fact that Risk
Manaucment complied with this Court's interpretation ofUtah law relating to the
provision of PIP benefits cannot create an estoppel against enforcement of the still
mandatory provision that a notice of claim be filed as to all other claims a plaintiff may
have. Nor can aplaintiff and her attorney be said to be acting with reasonable prudence
and diligence if they misinteipreted such conduct. An attorney should be considered to be
conversant with the law applicable to his or her area ofpractice. Rule 1.1, Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Nor do the claims of other contacts between the plaintiff, her attorney and Risk
Management show any effort to mislead the plaintiff as to the necessity offiling the
statutory notices ofclaim. Indeed, plaintiffs counsel sought to do so, but failed to comply
with the clear statutory requirement that one be sent to the Attorney General. R. 138-39.
Again, no facts were alleged which would show that persons acting with reasonable
prudence and diligence would have considered that they had been told to ignore the
statutory notice of claim requirements.
The only other claim is that an unidentified employee of Risk Management told the
paralegal working for plaintiffs attorney to file her notice ofclaim with that agency. This
is far short of the facts upon which this Court found estoppel in Bischel v. Merritt, 907
P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995). The plaintiff reads Bischel too broadly. Amore closely
analogous decision ofthis Court's is that ofBcllonio v. Salt Lake City Corp., 91 1P.2d
1294 (Utah App. 1996).
In Bischel, this court allowed a claim against Salt Lake County to proceed
despite the fact that the notice of claim was, in fact, served upon the Salt
Lake County Attorney, rather than upon the Salt Lake County Commission
as dictated by section 13. While Bischel may, at first blush, appear to be
controlling in this case, that opinion was based upon a unique set of facts
which is absent in this appeal.
In Bischel, the plaintiff was unsure of how to serve the county commission
with a notice of claim; therefore, she did an entirely sensible thing and
called the commission to ask for instructions, She was instructed, by an
agent of the commission, to serve her notice of claim upon the Salt Lake
County Attorney. On those facts, this court found that the plaintiffhad
complied with the statute, as misinterpreted for her by the county
commission.
Finally, unlike the facts in Bischel, Kern was never the agent, apparently or
in fact, of the mayor or the city council. 'While the Salt Lake Airport
Authority is not a political subdivision, but rather a division of Salt Lake
City Corporation., it is certainly not the governing body of Salt Lake City
nor the agent of the mayor or the city council. Therefore, unlike the
plaintiff in Bischel, Bcllonio never even attempted to direct his notice of
claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor or the city council.
911 P.2d at 1297-98 (some citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Just as in Bcllonio, the plaintiffcould not rely upon the alleged instructions of a
city employee who was not a direct agent of the governing body (the proper pcison to
10
receive the notice of claim), plaintiff in this action cannot rely upon alleged instructions
from an employee of Risk Management as to how to serve the Attorney General. To
permit such would be to permit counsel to claim that he or she was instructed in how to
practice law by any and all laypersons employed by the State ofUtah.
That the alleged facts fall short of showing estoppel against the state is especially
true when the instructions given were proper, though apparently cither misunderstood or
misguided. Unlike the city attorney in Bcllonio, who's alleged instructions were simply
wrong. Risk Management has been found by this Court to be a proper recipient ofnotices
ofclaim as the "agency concerned." The alleged instructions would permit proper filing
of a notice of claim with Risk Management, as was actually done. The error comes from
the paralegal acting as ifonly one notice ofclaim, and not two, were involved.
Plaintiffs agent did not inquire, as did the plaintiff in Bischel as to how to serve
the appropriate governing body, but rather for instructions on whom to serve a notice of
claim on. The statute is clear that one of the two notices of claim must be served on, and
addressed to. the Attorney General. As a matter of law the trial court correctly found that
the plaintiff had failed to make her necessary showing ofacting with reasonable prudence
and diligence in serving a separate government entity instead ofthe Attorney General.
This is especially so when just four or so years earlier this Court had expressly found that
the agency in question was an appropriate "agency concerned" under the same statute.
11
Nor does this result change based upon the trial court's temporary misreading of
the affidavit of the claims adjuster. Mr. Sefondonakis stated that he had not reviewed the
notice of claim that he received it, nor had he made any effort to determine its validity. R.
115. It was only after the time for filing ofanotice ofclaim had run that he reviewed the
notice due to some further correspondence he had received from plaintiffs counsel, and
discovered that it had never been filed with the Attorney General. R. 116. He then
disavowed that he had intentionally waited until it would be too late to correct the error
before communicating with plaintiffs counsel. R. 117. The trial court erroneously read
this last paragraph to infer that Mr. Sefandonakis had contacted plaintiffs counsel earlier
than he had.
These facts are irrelevant to the question of the validity of the notices of claim
filed by the plaintiff Indeed, the trial court, when its error was pointed out to it and
seeing the growing arguments between the parties as to what was or wasn't said in sundry
telephone conversations (R. 187-88, 199-206) correctly pointed out that:
The exchanges and allegations between counsel are unfortunate but
demonstrate why strict compliance to the statute is required. The facts
surrounding the "providing" of notice are much in dispute, and if taken in a
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, still would not suffice as service or
result in an enlargement of the Bischel approach Expansion of the Bischel
doctrine in this Court's view is inappropriate.
R.231.
For these reasons, the defendants urge this Court to affirm the trial court's
dismissal of this action for lack of jurisdiction.
12
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, defendants Utah State University and Haven B.
Hendricks ask this Court to affirm the dismissal of this action.
DEFENDANTS DO NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
The defendants-appellees do not request oral argument and a published opinion in
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided by this
Court in published opinions, are not such that oral argument ora published opinion are
necessary, thoutzh the defendants desire to participate in oral argument if such is held by
the Court.
^Respectfully submitted this /^ day of August, 2000.
BRENT A. BURNETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants-Appellees
13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ihereby certify that Imailed two true and exact copies ofthe foregoing Brief of
Defendants-Appellees, postage prepaid, to the following on this the _/_/ day of
August, 2000:
Randall K. Edwards
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
50 South Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM "A"
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Amanda THIMMES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs. )
)
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Civil No. 990100050
) Judge Gordon J. LOW
Defendant. )
)
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Said motion is
supported bv memorandum. Plaintiff fled her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, together with Defendant's Motion to Treat Motion to Dismiss as Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion for Continuance. Having considered the foregoing, the Court
now issues this Memorandum Decision.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss prays the Court to dismiss this action because Plaintiff
failed to provide statutory notice under Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-13(1998).
Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court on January 11, 1997, seeking recovery for
injuries sustained when she was struck by aUtah State University utility truck on March 17,
1997. On March 3, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that Plaintiff failed to
satisfy statutory notice requirements of §63-30-13 U.C.A. (1998) by submitting aNotice of
Claim not with the State Attorney General, but with the Division ofRisk Management and Utah
State University. Defendant's objection rested on the requirement of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13
(1998) that aNotice of Claim be submitted to the Attorney General where the State is aparty.
On March 25, 1999, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, relying in
large part on Bischel v. Mcrritt. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) and the Utah Court of
Appeals' discussion regarding serving notice on the governmental entities.
The issue before this Court is whether Plaintiffs form of notice is satisfactory under
Bischel and Utah Code; or whether Plaintiffs notice is insufficient and Plaintiffs ease should „
>
I'M &i
therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as per Lamanj£jML!2er£L oOiansn,, 828 P.2d
535 (Utah Cl. App. 1992).
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-1 l(3)(b) (1998) provides that "[t]he notice of claim shall be . ..
directed and delivered to .. the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah."
Absent any indication to the contrary, the statute is clear that notice must be given to the attorney
general-not to the Division of Risk Management, not to the University of Utah, nor to any other
person or department except for the attorney general herself. It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed
to do so. Therefore the conclusion rests on any further illumination that may exist.
Plaintiff justifies the form of notice by appealing to Bischel. However, Bischel is fatally
distinguishable on anumber of points, fust, Bischd concerned submitting anotice of claim on a
county. While not in an of itself problematic, it becomes an important distinction when seen in
the context ofthe 1993 Amendments, which were the basis of the Bischel notice issue. The 1993
Amendments to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 do not specify where notice should be submitted.
Rather, they cross-reference Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13, which merely states that "[a] claim
against apolitical subdivision ... is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the governing
body ofthe political subdivision within one year after the claim arises." Bischel at 277 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13). In other words, the language ofthe 1993 Amendments lacks
specificity as applied to Bischel, but which is not the problem in the instant case. The statute is
clear: notice must be submitted to the attorney general. Absent such notice, this Court lacks
jurisdiction.
Second, the Court of Appeals in Bischel felt that the purposes ofthe notice provision
were satisl led. This is inapplicable in the present case, again because the statute is clear. The
statute simply does not recognize notice except to the attorney general. This is not amere
expression of legislative will; rather, it is aclear statutory mandate. The argument that the
statute's general purposes are met cannot provide abasis for deviation from the clear legislative
language.
Third, the courts have treated the Governmental Immunity Act with particular delicacy.
Absent arare exception in an unrefined statute such as in the Bischel case, the courts follow a
pattern of strict compliance with the act. So doing results in the same conclusion: notice was
improper.
rt°(
Fourth, while policy considerations might lean in favor of not dismissing aease where
actual notice exists simply due to aprocedural flaw, similar considerations favor requiring parties
to meet simple statutory guidelines to ensure that notice is received and claims do not mire the
wrong divisions, departments or individuals in the various government entities.
In addition to the above, the affidavit filed by the state makes it clear that notice was not
only statutorily insufficient but actually not provided to the attorney general. Further, the
deficiency was brought to the attention of Plaintiff scounsel amonth prior to the deadline for
filing, thereby allowing sufficient time for resubmitting the notice in compliance with the statute.
The Plaintiff has argued that the spirit ofthe Bischel opinion provides this Court with sufficient
latitude to waive strict compliance and accept jurisdiction. The Court will not take that liberty
with the statute on the Bischel language ands\ such relief will have to be obtained, ifat all. from
the Bischel Court.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court has no jurisdiction and Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss is granted.
X
Dated this/y day of September. 1999.
1*0
j3o"rdon J. Low
•.District Court Judg
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ADDENDUM "B"
/IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
AMANDA THIMMES,
Plaintiff,
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY,
HAVEN 13. HENDRICKS, and JOHN
DOES 1 through 10,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 990100050
This matter is before the Court an Objection to Proposed Order. Motion for Reconsideration
or. Alternatively, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or to Set Aside Judgment, all brought by the
Plaintiff. The exchange ofpleadings raise anumber ofconcerns respecting the issuance ofanearlier
Memorandum Decision and Order by the Court.
The exchanges and allegations between counsel are unfortunate but demonstrate why strict
compliance to the statute is required. The facts surrounding the "providing" ofnotice arc much in
dispute, and if taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, still would not suffice as service or
result in an enlargement ofthe Bischel approach. Expansion ofthe Bischel doctrine in this Court's
view is inappropriate.
For the above reasons and more specifically those set forth in the Defendant's response, the
motion is denied. Counsel for the Defendant directed to prepare a formal order in conformance
herewith.
•/Dated the ^^tfay of November. 1999.
BY THE O
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